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We study optimal income taxation and public debt policy in a neoclassical economy pop-
ulated by in¯nitely-lived households and a benevolent government. The government makes
sequential decisions on the provision of a valued public good, on income taxation and the
issue of public debt. We characterize and compute Markov-perfect optimal ¯scal policy in
this economy with two payo®-relevant state variables: physical capital and public debt. We
¯nd two stable, steady-state equilibria: one with no income taxation and positive government
asset holdings, and another with positive taxation and public debt issuances. We prove that
the two steady states are associated with di®erent policy rules, which implies a multiplicity
of (expectation-driven) Markov-perfect equilibria.
Keywords: Optimal taxation; optimal public debt; Markov-perfect equilibrium; Time-consistent
policy.
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In most developed economies, income tax rates and government debt levels are positive and
sizable. In the US, e®ective income tax rates have been in the order of 20%, and outstanding
public debt represents about 60% of GDP. The main question we pose in this paper is: can
these numbers be accounted for as the outcome of a government's welfare maximization program
in a neoclassical economy? To address this question we adopt the standard framework in the
literature of optimal ¯scal policy, and drop the assumption of government's full commitment to
future policies. Instead, we assume that the government has no access to commitment devices nor
to reputation mechanisms, and, therefore, we restrict our attention to Markovian optimal policies.
Our answer to the above question is in the a±rmative, provided this is the policy expected by
households and all successive governments.
The observation of positive income taxes and, especially, of positive levels of public debt has
been at odds with most neoclassical theories of optimal ¯scal policy. Indeed, the now classical
result by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) establishes that a committed government will not use
distortionary taxation in the long run. The optimal policy set by such a government involves
high taxation in the short run in order to build up enough assets to ¯nance future government
expenditure, so that distortionary taxation can be disposed of in the long run. In economies with
government's full commitment, this result has been proved to be robust to a number of non-trivial
departures from the standard framework.
In this paper, we study a neoclassical economy populated by in¯nitely-lived consumers, com-
petitive ¯rms operating a constant-returns-to-scale production technology, and a benevolent gov-
ernment. The government makes sequential decisions on the provision of a valued public good,
on income taxation and the issue of public debt. We characterize and compute Markov-perfect
optimal ¯scal policy in this economy with two payo®-relevant state variables: physical capital
and public debt. Other than imposing di®erentiable strategies, we do not restrict further the
de¯nition of Markov perfection. Hence, we look at all Markov-perfect equilibria of the in¯nite-
horizon economy, including those which are the limit of equilibria of the ¯nite-horizon economy
and those which only emerge with in¯nite horizons.
The main results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. In the class of models con-
sidered in this paper, the uniqueness of a stable, steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium is not
guaranteed. We ¯nd two stable, steady-state equilibria: one with positive distortions to both the
consumption/savings margin and the private/public consumption margin; and the other with no
distortions. Moreover, in a calibrated version of the model that matches key US observations, we
show that a 20% income tax rate and a debt-GDP ratio of 60% emerge as the optimal ¯scal pol-
icy in the steady-state equilibrium with positive distortions. The equilibrium with no distortions
2yields zero income taxes and negative levels of public debt. We prove that convergence to these
long-run equilibria is not pinned down by initial conditions but by expectations on government
policy. That is, Markov-perfect optimal ¯scal policy is driven by expectations.
In the economy of our model, the multiplicity of expectation-driven Markov-perfect equilibria
does not arise if the government is required to balance its budget on a period-by-period basis,
in which case income taxation becomes the only source of government revenue. It is only when
governments are allowed to run unbalanced budgets and, therefore, to spread the burden of
¯nancing the provision of the public good that expectations play a role in the determination of
optimal ¯scal policy. Thus, expectations that all future governments will dispose of distortionary
taxation if given enough assets to ¯nance the provision of the public good, will render such a
policy optimal. On the other hand, expectations that all governments will issue debt in order to
pass on part of the burden of ¯nancing current expenditure to the next government will lead to
an optimal policy with income taxation, issues of debt and, consequently, positive wedges. As we
show below, the existence of this latter equilibrium hinges on the assumption that the economy
runs for an in¯nite number of periods, and therefore there is no last government unable to pass
on the burden.1 A feature common to the two equilibria is that governments use public debt to
reduce long-run tax distortions, as compared to the economy without debt.
In economies without capital, the existence of two steady-state Markov-perfect equilibria has
been recently shown by a number of authors. In these economies, however, equilibrium dynamics
are drastically di®erent to what we ¯nd in the economy with capital and debt. Martin (2006)
and D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, Giovannetti, Marimon and Teles (2006), study optimal monetary policy in
economies with debt and ¯nd two steady-state debt levels, only one of which is stable. These
authors show that the two steady states are generated by the same policy function and, therefore,
the Markov-perfect equilibrium is unique. Krusell, Martin and R¶ ³os-Rull (2006) study optimal
debt policy in a model with exogenous government expenditure, labor taxation and no capital.
In their economy, the steady-state equilibrium with positive distortions is not stable. Indeed, the
authors show that the equilibrium contains a large, countable set of long-run debt levels. Initial
conditions pin down the element in this set to which the economy converges in a maximum of
two periods.
Our paper is also related to a large body of literature dealing with optimal ¯scal policy in
environments with no commitment. Thus, within the context of economies without public debt,
Markov-perfect optimal taxation has been ¯rst studied by Klein and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003), Klein,
1The expectational multiplicity of the equilibrium in our economy is thus of a di®erent nature to that found
by Calvo (1988) in a two-period economy with public debt and costly debt repudiation. This author shows the
existence of two expectation-driven equilibria: a \good" Pareto-e±cient equilibrium in which there is no debt
repudiation, and a \bad" Pareto-ine±cient equilibrium where debt is partially repudiated.
3Krusell and R¶ ³os-Rull (2006) and then by Ortigueira (2006). Indeed, our paper is an extension of
the framework presented in Klein, Krusell and R¶ ³os-Rull (2006) to include public debt. A related
body of literature has developed after the paper by Lucas and Stokey (1983), who study the
role of public debt as a substitute for commitment in Ramsey economies without capital. They
show that the Ramsey policy is consistent if governments can commit to inherited debt contracts.
Speci¯cally, they show that future governments will comply with the ¯scal plans chosen today
if the current government delegates rich enough state-contingent multiple-period debt contracts.
Later, Persson, Persson and Svenson (1988) extend this line of research to monetary policy
inconsistency. Finally, Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and SeppÄ alÄ a (2002) modify the Stokey and
Lucas (1993) model by dropping the complete markets assumption, which introduces a history
dependence on the debt path, as opposed to a contingency to future states. Again, they do
not provide support for an optimal positive long-run level of government debt. Due to market
incompleteness, the Ramsey planner in their economy lets public debt converge to a negative
level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, characterizes Markov-perfect
equilibria and shows the existence of the two steady states. In Section 3 we parameterize and
calibrate our model economy and compute Markov-perfect equilibrium. We also compare Marko-
vian policies with those arising in the e±cient and the Ramsey equilibrium. Section 4 presents a
description of our numerical algorithm. Section 5 concludes and Section 6 contains the Appendix.
2 The Model
Our framework is the standard, non-stochastic neoclassical model of capital accumulation,
extended to include a benevolent government that provides a valued public good. In order to
¯nance the provision of such public good the government can levy a tax on household's income
and issue public debt. Thus, ¯scal policy in each period consists of the amount of the public good
provided, Gt, the tax rate on income, ¿t, and the issue of public debt, Bt+1, which matures in
period t + 1.
We begin by describing the problem solved by each agent in this economy. We then charac-
terize the ¯scal policy set by the benevolent government lacking the ability to commit to future
policies. In order to help compare our results with the case of full commitment, we also present
a brief review of ¯scal policy in the Ramsey equilibrium.
42.1 Households
There is a continuum of homogeneous households with measure one. Each household supplies
one unit of labor and chooses consumption and savings in order to maximize lifetime utility,







ct + kt+1 + bt+1 = kt + bt + (1 ¡ ¿t)[wt + (rt ¡ ±)kt + qtbt]; 8t (2.2)
k0 > 0 and b0 given,
where small letters are used to denote individual variables and capital letters to denote economy-
wide values. Function U(¢) in equation (2.1) is the instantaneous utility function, which depends
on the consumption of a private good, ct, and the consumption of a public good, Gt. U(¢) is
assumed to be continuously di®erentiable, increasing and concave; and 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount
factor. Labor is supplied inelastically at a real wage rate wt. Household's asset holdings are made
up of physical capital, kt, which is rented to ¯rms at the rate rt, and government's bonds, bt,
which bear an interest denoted by qt. Physical capital depreciates at a rate denoted by 0 < ± < 1.
Household's total income, net of capital depreciation, is taxed at the rate ¿t. If the government
is a net lender to the private sector |i.e., the household borrows from the government, bt < 0|
taxable income is net of interest payments.
2.2 Firms
Firms are competitive and produce an aggregate good with a neoclassical production tech-
nology. Total production is given by,
Yt = F(Kt;Lt) = F(Kt;1) = f(Kt); 8t (2.3)
where Kt denotes the aggregate or economy-wide stock of capital. First-order conditions to pro¯ts
maximization imply the typical demand and zero-pro¯ts equations,
rt = fK(Kt) (2.4)
wt = f(Kt) ¡ rtKt (2.5)
2.3 Government
Government's ¯scal policy involves the setting of both the provision of the public good and its
¯nancing, taxes and debt. The government is benevolent in the sense that it seeks to maximize
5households' lifetime utility (2.1), subject to its budget constraint, to a feasibility restriction, and
to private sector's ¯rst-order conditions. In addition, government's policies may be conditioned
by its lack of commitment. The budget constraint of the government is,
Gt + (1 + qt)Bt = Bt+1 + ¿t [wt + (rt ¡ ±)Kt + qtBt] (2.6)
where the right-hand side of equation (2.6) represents government's revenues, which are made up
of the issue of debt, Bt+1, plus revenues from income taxation. The left-hand side is government's
total expenditure, including the provision of the public good, the repaying of outstanding public
debt and ¯nancial expenses.
2.4 Ramsey optimal ¯scal policy
This Section presents a brief review of the Ramsey ¯scal policy in our model economy. In a
Ramsey equilibrium, the benevolent government is assumed to have full commitment to future
policies, and, thus, it can credibly announce the whole sequence of public expenditure, income
taxes and issues of debt from the ¯rst period onwards. This allows the government to anticipate
equilibrium reactions by the private sector to its ¯scal policy. Hence, the problem of the gov-
ernment in the Ramsey equilibrium is to choose sequences for taxes and public debt so that the
competitive equilibrium maximizes social welfare [equation (2.1)].
Proposition 1 below presents the optimal ¯scal policy in the steady-state Ramsey equilibrium
for our economy. Since the result in Proposition 1 is well known in the literature of optimal ¯scal
policy we only provide a sketch of the proof (see the Appendix).
Proposition 1: In the steady-state Ramsey equilibrium the tax rate on income is zero and the
government holds positive assets, i.e. B < 0.
2.5 Markov-Perfect optimal ¯scal policy
In this Section we drop the assumption of government's full commitment to future policies and
study time-consistent optimal policies. More speci¯cally, we will focus on di®erentiable Markov-
perfect equilibria of this economy populated by a continuum of households and a government that
acts sequentially, foreseeing its future behavior when choosing current levels of the public good,
income taxes and the issue of debt. The restriction to di®erentiable Markov-perfect policies is
justi¯ed by our use of calculus in the characterization of the equilibria. A further remark on the
assumption of di®erentiability will follow below.
Following the literature on markovian policies, we assume that the government |although can
not commit to future policies|, does commit to honoring the tax rate it announces for the current
6period, and to repaying outstanding debt obligations. The commitment to current taxes implies
an intra-period timing of actions that grants the government leadership in the setting of the tax
rate for the period. That is, at the beginning of period t, the time-t government sets the tax rate
for the period; next, once that choice is publicly known, consumers choose consumption/savings
and the composition of their portfolios, and the government chooses the provision of the public
good (or equivalently, the issue of debt). Governments are thus (intra-period) Stackelberg players
and can therefore anticipate the e®ects of current taxation on household's decisions.
In sum, we assume that the time-t government has intra-period commitment to time-t taxes
but not to debt issues. In our opinion, this ¯ts well the timing of actions in real economies, where,
typically, governments make decisions on taxes at discrete times but issue debt continuously. [For
a discussion on the e®ects of the timing of actions on markovian policies see Ortigueira (2006).]
The optimization problem of a typical household
When choosing consumption and savings, the household knows the tax rate for the period, and
forms expectations for both the current government's debt policy and for the future governments'
¯scal policy. The household chooses (i) how much to consume and save; and (ii) how to allocate
savings between physical capital and public debt.
Hence, the problem of a household that holds k and b of the physical and government assets,
respectively, that has to pay taxes on current income at rate ¿, that expects the current and
future governments to issue new debt according to the policy ÃB : (K£B£¿) ! B0, and expects








c + k0 + b0 = k + b + (1 ¡ ¿)[w(K) + [r(K) ¡ ±]k + q(K)b];
where ~ v(k0;b0;K0;B0) is the continuation value as foreseen by the household. !(K);r(K) and
q(K) are pricing functions. The economy-wide stock of physical capital is expect to evolve
according to the law K0 = H(K;B;¿), say. By using the assumption of a representative agent,
i.e., k = K and b = B, and the government's budget constraint, it follows from (2.7) that the
consumption function in a competitive equilibrium |where today's tax rate is ¿, future taxes
are set according to policy Ã¿ and current and futures issues of debt are set according to policy
ÃB| can be expressed in terms of K;B and ¿, say C(K;B;¿), and must satisfy the following
Euler equation,











7where B0 = ÃB(K;B;¿) and ¿0 = Ã¿(K0;B0). In equilibrium K0 is given by,
K0 = K + B + (1 ¡ ¿)[f(K) ¡ ±K + q(K)B] ¡ C (K;B;¿) ¡ B0; (2.9)
where G and G0 are given by the time-t and time-(t + 1) governments' budget constraints, re-
spectively. Finally, pricing functions !(K) and r(K) are given by (2.4) and (2.5), and q(K) must
satisfy the non-arbitrage condition between the two assets,
q(K) = fK(K) ¡ ±: (2.10)
In equilibrium, capital and debt yield the same return, meaning that q is independent of B.
The fact that the interest rate on public debt is independent of B implies an important departure
from economies without physical capital. We will comment further on this issue below.
Equation (2:8) has the usual Euler interpretation: the marginal utility of consumption equals
the present value of the last unit of income devoted to savings. Since physical capital and debt
yield the same return in equilibrium, the supply of public debt determines the composition of the
household's portfolio. This implies a one-to-one crowding out of investment in capital by public
debt. Taxation, on the other hand, a®ects disposable income and the level of consumption, and
thus translates into a non-one-to-one crowding out of capital investment. The problem of the
government is shown next.
The problem of the government
As explained above, the government's lack of commitment to future policies and our focus on
Markov-perfect equilibria allows us to think of the government as a sequence of governments, one
for each time period. Thus the time-t government sets the tax rate for the period and issues new
debt foreseeing the ¯scal policy set by successive governments. Following the timing of actions
established above, the time-t government is an intra-period Stackelberg player in our economy:
At the beginning of the period, it chooses the income tax rate for that period taking into account
the e®ect of ¿ on the level of consumption, as given by the consumption function, C(K;B;¿),
that solves (2.8). In a second stage, the government sets the issue of debt. The problem of the
government is thus solved backwards. Given the initial choice for taxes, the issue of debt is the
solution to,
V (K;B;¿) = max
B0
n




K0 = (1 ¡ ±)K + f(K) ¡ C(K;B;¿) ¡ G
G = ¿ [f(K) ¡ ±K + q(K)B] + B0 ¡ [1 + q(K)]B;
and equation (2.10);
8where V (K;B;¿) is the value to the time-t government that has set the tax rate at ¿ and foresees
the ¯scal policy to be set by future governments. ~ V (K0;B0) is next-period value as foreseen by the
time-t government. The issue of debt that solves this problem can thus be written as B0(K;B;¿).








K0 = (1 ¡ ±)K + f(K) ¡ C(K;B;¿) ¡ G
G = ¿ [f(K) ¡ ±K + q(K)B] + B0 (K;B;¿) ¡ [1 + q(K)]B;
and equation (2.10);
The following proposition characterizes the ¯scal policy set by the time-t government.
Proposition 2: The tax and debt policy that solves the government's problem is the solution to

















































Proof: See the Appendix.
Some comments on notation are in order. Function arguments in equations (2.13) and (2.14)
have been omitted for expositional clarity. Subscripts denote the variable with respect to which
the derivative is taken. A prime in a variable indicates next-period values, and a prime in
a function indicates it is evaluated at next-period variables. Finally, G¿ and GB denote the
derivatives of G with respect to ¿ and B, respectively, holding B0 constant.
Before providing an interpretation of the two Generalized Euler Equations presented in Propo-
sition 2, we o®er the following de¯nition. A Markov-perfect equilibrium in our economy can be
loosely de¯ned as:
De¯nition: A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a quadruplet of functions C(K;B;¿), ÃB(K;B;¿),
Ã¿(K;B) and W(K;B), such that:
(i) Given ÃB and Ã¿, C(K;B;¿) solves the household's maximization problem.
9(ii) Given C(K;B;¿), ÃB and Ã¿ solve the government's maximization problem. That is,
B0 = ÃB(K;B;¿) and ¿ = Ã¿(K;B).
(iii) W(K;B) is the value function of the government, and W(K;B) = ~ V (K;B).
The two Generalized Euler Equations, (2.13) and (2.14), which characterize Markov-perfect
taxation and debt policies, respectively, have the following interpretation. Equation (2:13) es-
tablishes that the tax rate has to equate the marginal value of taxation to the marginal value
of investing in physical capital. Equation (2.14) establishes that the issue of debt has to equate
the marginal value of issuing debt to the marginal value of investing in physical capital (and
consequently to the marginal value of taxation). In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, the govern-
ment is indi®erent between using taxes or debt to ¯nance the provision of the public good. Both
equations involve only wedges between today and tomorrow, as posterior wedges are implicitly
handled optimally by an envelope argument. Consecutive governments, however, disagree on
how much to tax tomorrow [the time-(t + 1) government does not internalize the distortionary
e®ects of its policy on time-t investment]. The current government thus takes into account the
e®ect of its policy on tomorrow's initial conditions, K0 and B0, in order help compensate for that
disagreement. Following this reasoning, one may interpret the di®erent terms in (2.13) and (2.14)
as follows.
The left-hand side of equation (2.13) is today's marginal utility of taxation per unit of savings
crowded out. The numerator of this expression is the change in utility from a marginal increase
in the tax rate, which is made up of the change in utility from the private good, UcC¿, plus the
change in utility from the public good, UGG¿. The denominator is the amount of savings crowded
out, or, equivalently, the change in consumption of the public and private good brought about
by the increase in the tax rate.
The right-hand side of equation (2.13) is the marginal utility of investing in physical capital.
An extra unit of investment today yields an increase in resources tomorrow by f0
K0 + 1 ¡ ±.
The breakdown of the value of these resources is: (i) C0
K0 of them are consumed as private good,
yielding a value of U0
c0C0
K0; (ii) G0
K0 corresponds to the increase in the provision of the public good
obtained from the increase in the tax base, which yields a value of U0
G0G0




K0 are taxed away, and the marginal value is the left-hand side of equation
(2.13), updated one period ahead. Hence, the right-hand side of (2.13) results from adding up all
these values and discounting.
Equation (2.14) is a non-arbitrage condition between taxation and public debt, and its in-
terpretation is equally straightforward. The right-hand side is the value of issuing an extra unit
of government debt today. The ¯rst term on the right-hand side is the value of today's extra
public good ¯nanced with the increase in government debt. The second term is the present value
10of the implied changes in tomorrow's consumption of the private and public good, C0
B0 and G0
B0,
respectively. Besides the direct e®ects on tomorrow's utility, these changes have an e®ect on to-
morrow's taxation, which must be valued using the marginal utility of taxation. Equation (2.14)
establishes that the value of issuing debt must equal the value of taxation (the left-hand side of
the equation).
A re-arrangement of equation (2:14) o®ers an alternative interpretation of the non-arbitrage


























Equation (2.15) says that the value of using debt instead of taxes to ¯nance the last unit of
public expenditure equals zero in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. The ¯rst term is the net change
in utility today of using debt instead of taxes per unit of forgone savings. The second term
captures the change in future distortions induced by the extra unit of public debt. The way the
current government trades o® these two wedges when choosing B0 depends on expectations on
future government policy. As will become clearer below, there is an equilibrium policy which
renders a non-zero wedge Uc ¡ UG in the long run.
2.5.1 Steady-State Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
A steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium is de¯ned as a list of in¯nite sequences for quantities
fCtg, fKtg, ¯scal variables, fGtg, f¿tg, fBtg and prices f!tg, frtg, and fqtg such that they
are generated by a Markov-perfect equilibrium, and its values do not change over time, i.e.
Kt+1 = Kt; Bt+1 = Bt; ¿t+1 = ¿t for all t, and the same is true for consumption and prices.
In this subsection we o®er some insights on the steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium of
our model economy, and prove three propositions. A ¯rst insight is related to the existence of two















This equation suggests that there may be two di®erent taxation and debt policies consistent
with the existence of a steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium. The ¯rst one corresponds to the
policy prescribed by the long-run Ramsey equilibrium. As shown in Proposition 1, the Ramsey
equilibrium prescribes zero income taxes and positive government asset holdings in the steady
state. The provision of the public good is ¯nanced entirely from the returns on government's
11assets, and therefore, Uc = UG. The next proposition proves that this policy is a Markov-perfect
equilibrium.
Proposition 3: The steady-state Ramsey equilibrium is a Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
In a related paper, Azzimonti-Renzo, Sarte and Soares (2006) study a model with di®erenti-
ated taxes on capital and labor, and exogenous government expenditure. Within their framework,
the authors ¯nd a Markov-perfect equilibrium which yields zero labor taxes from all initial condi-
tions, K and B, and zero capital taxes from next-period onwards. As con¯rmed by our numerical
computations, this result also holds in our model economy: when there are no exogenous bounds
on income taxation, there exists a Markov-perfect equilibrium in which income taxes are zero
after one period, and government assets converge to the long-run Ramsey value. Furthermore,
for some initial conditions the initial income tax is negative, which amounts to a subsidy to
households.
The second taxation and debt policy consistent with a steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium
involves positive income taxes and the issuing of government's bonds. Under this policy Uc 6= UG,
and the second term on the left-hand side of equation (2.16) is zero. The next proposition presents
an important feature of the steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium with positive taxation.
Proposition 4: Along a steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium with positive distortions, gov-
ernment bonds are not net wealth, i.e., CB(K¤;B¤;¿¤) = 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Even though we do not have a formal proof establishing that the maximum number of stable,
interior steady-state equilibria is two, our numerical computations lead us to be con¯dent that this
is the case. Our exploration of di®erent subsets of the state space produced only a steady-state
equilibrium with positive taxation and public debt.
The existence of two stable, steady-state equilibria raises a question concerning equilibrium
dynamics from initial values K0 and B0. Proposition 5 below proves that the government's policy
rules generating the two steady states are di®erent, which implies that steady-state multiplicity is
expectational. Therefore, given initial conditions K0 and B0, expectations on government policy
determine equilibrium dynamics and convergence to one of the two long-run equilibria. The basic
idea of the proof relies on the fact that the steady-state equilibrium with positive distortions is
not the limit of the ¯nite-horizon economy's Markov-perfect equilibrium as the time horizon goes
to in¯nity. Actually, we show that the steady-state equilibrium with no distortions is the only
limit of the ¯nite-horizon equilibrium.
12Proposition 5: The two steady-state Markov-perfect equilibria are not associated with the same
pair of decision rules Ã¿ and ÃB. Hence, given K0 and B0, the Markov-perfect equilibrium is
(globally) indeterminate.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The next section presents a numerical analysis of the global dynamic properties of the steady-
state Markov-perfect equilibrium with positive distortions.
3 The Markov-perfect equilibrium in a calibrated economy
In this section we parameterize our model economy, set values to its parameters and com-
pute Markov-perfect equilibria. A special attention will be devoted to the presentation of the
Markov-perfect equilibrium rendering distortinary taxation and positive debt in the long run. We
also compare Markov-perfect equilibria to the equilibrium under commitment (the Ramsey equi-
librium), both with balanced and unbalanced government budgets, and to the e±cient solution
(lump-sum taxation). A detailed explanation of our computational approach can be found in the
next section.




(c Gµ)1¡¾ ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¾
; (3.1)
where 0 < µ < 1, and 1=¾ denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of the composite
good. The functional form for the production technology is the standard Cobb-Douglas function,
with ® denoting the capital's share of income, i.e.,
f(K) = AK®; A > 0: (3.2)
Parameter values are set as follows. The constant in the production function, A, and the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ¾, are both set equal to one. The value of
® is set at 0.36, which is the capital's share income in the US economy; the depreciation rate of
capital is set at 0.09, which is a standard value in macroeconomic models; ¯ is set a 0.96, and
µ is 0.2 so that the public-to-private consumption ratio falls within the range 15 ¡ 30% for all
equilibrium concepts mentioned above. These parameter values are in line with those in Klein,
R¶ ³os-Rull and Krusell (2006), Ortigueira (2006) and many others.
We start by presenting steady-state values for the three equilibrium concepts |namely, the
equilibrium with lump-sum taxes, the Ramsey equilibrium and the Markov-perfect equilibrium|,




No Debt With Debt No Debt With Debt* No Debt With Debt
Y 1.7608 1.7608 1.7011 1.7608 1.6710 1.6934
K 4.8144 4.8144 4.3742 4.8144 4.1632 4.3201
C 1.1063 1.1063 1.0895 1.1063 0.9911 1.1017
G 0.2213 0.2213 0.2179 0.2213 0.3052 0.2032
G=C 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3079 0.1844
¿ T = G indet. 0.1666 0 0.2354 0.1905
B=Y indet. -3.015 0.5639
W -5.0157 -5.0157 -5.4756 -5.0157 -6.1565 -5.5525
Notes: Steady-state values and policy for the e±cient, Ramsey and Markov-perfect equilibria,
with and without public debt. * Note that in the economy with debt the steady-state Ramsey
equilibrium is also a Markov-perfect equilibrium.
The ¯rst two columns in Table 1 show a well-known result. When lump-sum taxation is
available, the government implements the e±cient solution, Uc = UG, and Ricardian equivalence
implies that public debt becomes irrelevant in terms of allocations and welfare. The third and
forth columns show the long-run Ramsey equilibrium. As is also well known, in a Ramsey
equilibrium the government will choose, when possible, not to distort long-run investment and,
therefore, will set income taxes to zero. It is thus clear that public debt plays a crucial role. When
the government is allowed to run unbalanced budgets, public expenditure is ¯nanced entirely from
the income generated by the assets held by the government. That is, negative public debt (positive
asset holdings) is the only source of income for the government in the steady-state equilibrium.
As shown in the forth column of Table 1, the Ramsey equilibrium prescribes a value for the assets
held by the government larger than the assets held by the private sector, and more than three
times the value of output.
The steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium in the economy with balanced budgets is shown
in the ¯th column. Finally, in the economy where the government is allowed to run unbalanced
budgets we found two steady-state Markov-perfect equilibria. The ¯rst one is the steady-state
Ramsey equilibrium, along which the government's lack of commitment is not a binding restric-
tion. The second equilibrium is shown in the last column of Table 1, and, in this case, the lack
of commitment is binding. In this latter equilibrium, income is taxed at a rate of 19:05% and the
debt-GDP ratio is 56:39%. These numbers fall well within the range of observed values in the
U.S. and in most developed economies.
14In our economy with physical capital accumulation and public debt, the con¯guration of
markovian equilibria di®ers drastically from that of the economy without capital, studied by
Krusell, Martin and R¶ ³os-Rull (2006). Contrary to their results, our steady-state equilibrium with
positive distortions is stable. In our economy with capital, there is a Markov-perfect equilibrium
whose time paths converge to this steady state, both for economies starting with debt levels below
and above the steady-state value. As we argued above, in the economy with physical capital the
equilibrium interest rate on public debt is determined by the stock of capital. And the current
government thus can a®ect tomorrow's interest rate only through the stock of capital.
Figures 1 to 7 below display equilibrium dynamics in a subset of the state space containing
this steady state. (Details on our method to compute Markov-perfect equilibria can be seen below
and in the next section.) Figures 1 to 3 show government's optimal ¯scal policy along the Markov-
perfect equilibrium converging to the steady state in the last column of Table 1. The optimal
income tax, as a function of K and B, is shown in Figure 1. The tax rate increases both with
capital and debt. Figure 2 shows government's debt policy. The issue of debt decreases sharply
with capital, indicating that capital-rich economies rely relatively less on public debt to ¯nance
government. Figure 3 shows public expenditure as a function of K and B. The private-good
consumption function is displayed in Figure 4.
The stability of the steady-state is shown in Figures 5 to 7. Net investment in physical capital,
K0 ¡K, is presented in Figure 5. In Figure 6 we plot the change in the level of outstanding debt,
B0 ¡ B. Finally, Figure 7 presents the two loci, K0 = K and B0 = B. The point in which these
two loci intersect corresponds to the steady-state values for K and B. The arrows indicate the
direction of the trajectories starting in the di®erent regions of the state space.
It should be noted that the Markov-perfect equilibrium shown in Figures 1 to 7 has been com-
puted using a global method. It becomes evident from a simple inspection of the Euler equation
and two the Generalized Euler equations that the standard method of linearizing around steady-
state values cannot be applied in our setting. Indeed, the equilibrium must be computed without
prior knowledge of steady-state values. Thus, the subset of the state space must be changed in
a trial-and-error process until it contains the steady-state equilibrium. Before moving on to the
next section where we explain our computation strategy, we draw attention to Figures 8 to 11
below. Figures 8, 9 and 10 plot relative residuals in the Euler equation and the two Generalized
Euler equations, respectively. Figure 11 shows relative residuals in the Bellman equation. It
should be noted that the errors are very small, less than 0:001 of 1 per cent. In addition to this,
the errors nearly satisfy the equioscillation property (the sign of the errors alternates between
positive and negative), and show almost equal amplitude throughout the considered subset of
the state space. All these properties of the errors indicate that our approximations are close to
being optimal, in the sense that there are no better polynomials to approximate the unknown
15functions.
The role of debt in the Markov-perfect equilibrium
In economies without public debt, the long-run Markov-perfect equilibrium yields high income
taxes, underconsumption of the private good and overconsumption of the public good. Actually,
the G=C ratio in the Markovian economy is 50% larger than in the e±cient equilibrium, and the
capital stock is 15% lower (see Table 1). This proneness of Markovian governments to overtax
in the economy without debt is a consequence of: (i) their lack of ability to internalize the
distortionary e®ects of current taxation on past investment, and (ii) their leadership to set taxes
before households choose consumption, which allows them to anticipate the response of current
consumption to taxes, and then diminishing the perceived crowding out of physical investment.
Public debt plays a key role curbing the tendency of Markovian governments to overtax in the
long run. In the steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium with distortionary taxation the G=C
ratio is 0:1844, which amounts to a 40% decrease with respect to the economy without debt.
Likewise, private consumption and capital are brought up closer to the e±cient allocation. The
ability of Markovian governments to issue debt is thus bound to have sizable e®ects on welfare.
4 Numerical Approach
In this section we outline our strategy for the computation of the Markov-perfect equilibrium.
The ¯rst challenge in the computation of the three unknown functions C(K;B;¿), Ã¿(K;B), and
ÃB(K;B;¿) stems from the presence of the derivatives of the consumption function in the two
generalized Euler equations, (2.13) and (2.14). In a steady state, these derivatives must be solve
for, thus making the number of unknowns exceed the number of equations.
Our computational method is an application of a projection method which approximates
the three unknown functions with a combination of Chebyshev polynomials. Within the class
of orthogonal polynomials, Chebyshev polynomials stand out for its e±ciency to approximate
smooth functions.2. The unknown coe±cients in the approximate functions are then obtained
so that the three functions satisfy the three Euler equations at some collocation points within a
subset of the state space, [Kmin;Kmax] £ [Bmin;Bmax].
2For a complete characterization of their properties and a rigorous exposition of projection techniques see
Judd (1992, 1998). For an previous application of these ideas to the computation of markovian optimal taxes see
Ortigueira (2006)
16Thus, we approximate functions for consumption, taxes and the issue of debt by:



























where Áij`(K;B;¿) and Áij(K;B) are tensor products of univariate Chebyshev polynomials, which
form the multidimensional basis for approximation. For instance, Áij(K;B) = Ái(K)Áj(B), with
Ái(K) denoting the Chebyshev polynomial of order i in K and Áj(B) the Chebyshev polynomial
of order j in B. Since Chebyshev polynomials are only de¯ned in the interval [¡1;1], K and B














Vectors ~ a; ~ d; ~ h in (4:1) ¡ (4:3) are the unknown coe±cients, which are pinned down by
imposing that ^ C(K;B;¿;~ a); ^ Ã¿(K;B; ~ d) and ^ ÃB(K;B;~ h) satisfy the three Euler equations and
the laws of motion at a number of collocation points. The number of collocation points is set
so that the number of equations equals the number of unknown coe±cients. In our exercise we
choose Chebyshev collocation. It should be noted that the approximation of the debt policy,
equation (4.3), embeds already the approximation of the tax policy in terms of K and B. On the
other hand, the approximation of the consumption function, (4.1), must be done in terms of K,
B and ¿, in order to obtain the derivatives of the consumption function which show up in the
Generalized Euler equations.
The value function, W(K;B), can then be easily computed as follows. Using the solutions for
consumption, taxation and the issue of debt, the value function is approximated by,








where the vector ~ e contains the unknown coe±cients in the value function, which are pinned down
so that (4.5) solves the government's Bellman equation at a number of collocation points.
175 Conclusion
This paper analyzes Markov-perfect optimal ¯scal policy in a neoclassical economy with
physical capital and public debt. We extend a recent literature on time-consistent policies to
economies where the government chooses government expenditures and households hold physical
capital and public debt in their portfolios. Previous studies on Markov-perfect policy abstract
from either public debt, by assuming a government's period-by-period balanced budget constraint,
or from physical capital, assuming that labor is the only factor of production.
We characterize and compute Markov-perfect optimal ¯scal policy in our model economy
and ¯nd two steady-state equilibrium con¯gurations. We prove that the steady-state Ramsey
equilibrium is a Markov-perfect equilibrium. In addition, our numerical computations ¯nd a
stable, steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium with positive income taxation and positive public
debt. In a calibrated version of the model, this latter equilibrium yields an income tax rate close
to 20% and a debt-GDP ratio in the order of 60%. This numbers are in line with those observed
in most developed economies. We argue that although the framework presented in this paper
displays an expectations-driven multiplicity of equilibria, it can help account for observed ¯scal
policies.
Our framework is rather stylized. We have abstracted from endogenous labor supply to
focus instead on the role of public debt in economies without commitment to future policies.
Although we do not believe that endogenizing labor supply, and allowing the government to set
di®erent taxes on capital and labor, would change our results qualitatively, it would certainly
have quantitative consequences. However, the computational costs associated with an extension
of our framework in that direction might be unsurmountable. As it was made clear in Section 4,
we are approximating three unknown functions |consumption as a function of capital, debt and
taxes, and two government policies as functions of capital and debt. Adding two new unknown
functions |labor supply and the tax policy on labor| and two new functional equations will
compromise the accuracy of the approximations even for small subsets of the state space.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
The problem solved by a government with full commitment is to set in¯nite sequences fGt;¿t;Btg







Ct + Kt+1 + Gt = f(Kt) + (1 ¡ ±)Kt (6.2)
Gt + [1 + rt ¡ ±]Bt = Bt+1 + ¿t[(rt ¡ ±)(Kt + Bt) + !t] (6.3)
Uc(Ct;Gt) = ¯Uc(Ct+1;Gt+1)[1 + (1 ¡ ¿t+1)(rt+1 ¡ ±)]; t = 0:::1; (6.4)
K0 and B0 are given.
After de¯ning new variables ~ rt ´ (1¡ ¿t)rt and ~ !t ´ (1¡ ¿t)!t, and formulating the problem
of the government as choosing after-tax rental prices, the ¯rst-order condition with respect to
Kt+1 can be written as,
¡t = ¯ [¤t+1(rt+1 ¡ ~ rt+1)) + ¡t+1(1 + rt+1 ¡ ±)]; (6.5)
where ¡t and ¤t are Lagrange multipliers. Using the Euler equation, equation (6.5) in a steady-
state equilibrium is,
(¡ + ¤)(r ¡ ~ r) = 0; (6.6)
from which it follows that ¿ = 0 in the steady-state equilibrium, and, consequently, B < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The ¯rst-order condition to B0 in government's maximization problem (2:11) is given by,
UGGB0 ¡ ¯ ~ V 0
K0GB0 + ¯ ~ V 0
B0 = 0: (6.7)






¡ ¯ ~ V 0
K0
¡
C¿ + G¿ + GB0B0
¿
¢
+ ¯ ~ V 0
B0B0
¿ = 0; (6.8)
which, after making use of (6.7), simpli¯es to,
UcC¿ + UGG¿ ¡ ¯ ~ V 0
K0 (C¿ + G¿) = 0: (6.9)
Envelope conditions, along with W(K;B) = ~ V (K;B), yield,
WK = UcCK + UGGK + ¯W0
K0 [1 + fK ¡ ± ¡ CK ¡ GK] (6.10)
WB = UcCB + UGGB + ¯W0
K0 [¡CB ¡ GB]: (6.11)
19Forwarding these envelope conditions one period and using the above ¯rst-order conditions,
we obtain the two Generalized Euler Equations, (2:13) and (2:14); presented in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3:
As shown in Proposition 1, in a steady-state Ramsey equilibrium income taxes are zero and
the government holds negative debt (assets) to ¯nance the provision of the public good. The
government does not rely on distortionary taxation, and the e±ciency condition, Uc = UG, is
attained. In this proof we show that the system of equations characterizing steady-state Markov-
perfect equilibria has a solution with these properties.
Let us start by assuming that Uc = UG. Then, from (6.9) it follows that Uc = ¯WK. From
(6.11) it is then easy to see that WB = 0. Finally, equation (6.10) becomes,
1
¯
= 1 + fK ¡ ±; (6.12)
which, along with the consumer's Euler equation, implies that ¿ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The proof follows directly from the ¯rst-order and envelope conditions presented above, along
with the non-arbitrage condition. Thus, by plugging the ¯rst-order condition to issues of debt
evaluated at a steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium into (6.11), it obtains that at a steady-
state equilibrium,
(1 + ¯GB)WB = (Uc ¡ UG ¡ ¯WB)CB: (6.13)
Then, plugging GB = ¡(1 ¡ ¿)q ¡ 1 and the non-arbitrage condition, q = fK ¡ ±; into equation
(6.13) and using the household's Euler equation, it follows that CB = 0 at the steady state.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Here we prove that the two steady-state equilibria |one with positive distortions and one
without| are not associated with the same pair of decision rules Ã¿ and ÃB. To do this, we show
that the policy rules generating the steady state with no distortions are the only limit of policy
rules in the ¯nite-horizon economy as the planning horizon goes to in¯nity. The proof, although
algebraically tedious, is straightforward.
In the ¯nite-horizon economy with last period denoted by T, we have KT+1 = BT+1 = 0.






CT = KT + BT + (1 ¡ ¿T)[f(KT) ¡ ±KT + qTBT] (6.14)
GT = ¿T [f(KT) ¡ ±KT + qTBT] ¡ (1 + qT)BT: (6.15)
The ¯rst-order condition to this problem is,
Uc(T) = UG(T); (6.16)
where Uc(T) denotes Uc(CT;GT).
In period T ¡ 1, the households' Euler equation is,
Uc(CT¡1;GT¡1) = ¯Uc(CT;GT)[1 + (1 ¡ ¿T)(fK (KT) ¡ ±)]; (6.17)
and the non-arbitrage condition between the two assets is qT = fK (KT) ¡ ±: The ¯scal policy
chosen by the time-(T ¡ 1) government is obtained in a two-step maximization problem. First,





GT¡1 = BT + ¿T¡1 [f(KT¡1) ¡ ± + qT¡1BT¡1] ¡ (1 + qT¡1)BT¡1 (6.18)
KT = f(KT¡1) + (1 ¡ ±)KT¡1 ¡ GT¡1 ¡ CT¡1 (6.19)
and equations (6:14);(6:15);(6:16) and (6:17):































equations (6:14);(6:15);(6:16);(6:17);(6:18);(6:19) and (6:20):






























dBT = ¡1: Using these values in equations (6.20) and (6.21), we
have h






@¿T¡1 6= 0; it thus follows that Uc(T¡1) = UG(T¡1). Then, using the fact that dCT
dKT + dGT
dKT =
1 + fK (KT) ¡ ±, equation (6.21) yields,
Uc(T ¡ 1) = ¯Uc(T)[1 + fK (KT) ¡ ±]: (6.23)
From this equation and the household's Euler equation it follows that ¿T = 0.
Solving the problem for period T ¡ 2, yields ¿T¡1 = 0. By proceeding in this way up to the
initial period, it can be shown that all taxes are zero but the initial one. That is, ¿0 6= 0 and
¿t = 0 for all t from 1 to T.
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Notes: Figures 1 to 4 show the policy functions in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. The
government's tax policy is shown in Figure 1. The government's debt policy is shown in Figure
2. The government's spending policy is displayed in Figure 3. Finally, the private consumption
function is shown in Figure 4.
24Equilibrium Dynamics





























































Notes: Figures 5 to 7 show the dynamics around the steady-state equilibrium with positive
income taxation. Figure 5 shows net investment; Figure 6 shows the change in government debt;
and Figure 7 shows the K0 = K and B0 = B loci.
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Notes: Figures 8 to 11 show relative errors of Chebyshev collocation for the Euler equation
(Figure 8), Generalized Euler equations (Figures 9 and 10) and the Bellman equation (Figure
11).
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